

## ARTICLE

# Recent work on traditional arguments for theism II

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**Abstract**

I survey recent and overlooked work on four of the most common and perennial arguments for theism: from morality, miracles, religious experience, and pragmatic considerations.

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

Theism is the view that there is a personal God like that worshiped by Jews, Muslims, and Christians. Theistic arguments are arguments for (or the rationality of belief in or commitment to) the existence of concrete being with at least one God-like attribute, such as necessity, God-like power or knowledge, ground of morality, creator or designer of the natural world, and so on. Having surveyed recent and overlooked work on cosmological, ontological, and design arguments in a prequel article, here I focus on four other of the most common and perennial theistic arguments: from morality, miracles, religious experience, and pragmatic considerations.<sup>1</sup>

## 2 | MORAL ARGUMENTS

It seems that every thread in the vast tapestry of moral thought and experience has been woven into a theistic argument. Even evil, so often appealed to as evidence against theism, has found its way into theistic arguments. If evil is a privation of goodness, or a deviation from how things ought to be, then goodness is primary and there is a way things ought to be—exactly what you'd expect if behind the world is a preeminently good being with plan (Alexander, 2012; Ganssle, 2013). But if naturalism is true, moral evil is just the human analog of animal savagery. This reductionistic analysis simply fails to capture all there is to evil, especially evils so appalling and horrendous as to be inexplicable apart from having some deep “cosmic significance” (Plantinga, 2007; see also Abraham, 2021).

Of course, if some things really are evil then morality generally is objective and not merely subjective. But philosophers have forcefully argued that there cannot be objective moral facts and duties in a Godless universe (Johnson, 2021), or at least that that would be exceedingly queer (Mavrodes, 1986). And bumps in ontology, when squished, tend to pop up in epistemology. Supposing naturalists can account for moral facts and duties, can we know them? Linville (2012), Ritchie (2012), et al. argue that naturalism leads to moral skepticism because our cognitive faculties are not designed to form beliefs that are true, as on theism, but evolved to form beliefs that aid survival. Our beliefs about morality should be regarded as reliable as our beliefs about the time after looking at a stopped clock: possibly true but only by accident, and so unjustified.

But back to ontology. Since morality seems essentially tied to persons, the nature and commands of a morally perfect person would indeed be an ideal ground for objective moral facts and duties, respectively. Furthermore,

the likeness of objective obligations and duties, understood as intrinsically motivating, authoritative imperatives, to divine commands wouldn't be so uncanny if that is just what they are (Adams, 1999; Evans, 2013; Mavrodes, 1986). The impact moral obligations can have on one's conscience is also noteworthy. Sometimes we appropriately feel guilt and shame for deeds done in secret even if those deeds harm no others. But guilt and shame are appropriately felt only in relation to other moral agents. So the guilt and shame for deeds done in secret are appropriately felt only if there's some other moral agent from whom we cannot hide (Cottingham, 2019; Newman, 1870). Regardless of whether wrongdoing sears the conscience, you might agree with Plato that wrongdoing is *intrinsically* harmful to the wrongdoer (recall the Ring of Gyges); it adversely affects one's objective wellbeing. Dore (1984) thinks this harm is best understood as punishment, but since punishment from mundane authorities is extrinsic, it must be punishment from a God-like being.

Relatedly, some argue for theism from the idea that there is moral order in the universe. According to Oderberg (2011), the universe exhibits moral order in that it's always rational to behave morally. But there can be moral order only if there's "cosmic justice" where all virtue is rewarded and vice punished, and there can be cosmic justice only if there's a cosmic judge who administers it. So, there is such a judge. Adams (1979) argues it's demoralizing to deny this, so there's moral advantage in accepting theism.

Is it always rational to behave morally, though? Yes, but again (it is argued) only if God exists. Baggett and Walls (2019) combine insights from Kant and Sidgwick to argue that acting morally is always rational only if it's always what's ultimately best for me, and acting morally is always what's ultimately best for me only if God exists. The latter is so because, if God does not exist, morality and self-interest come apart, leaving us with the question of why I should be moral when I'd personally be worse off for doing so. Layman's (2002) argument is similar, but adds that an afterlife is required to make up for when acting morally requires great sacrifice for only modest benefits in this life. Zagzebski (1987) thinks the question of why I should even *try* to be moral is more poignant, seeing as doing so would be rational only if one believes the attempt would likely be successful. But it's not rational to believe the attempt would likely be successful if all we have is our own human faculties to go on. So it's rational to try to be moral only if we have the benefit of more than just our own human faculties to go on. Hare (1996) is similarly troubled by the gap between the demand that morality places on us and our natural capacity to live up to it. Since "ought" implies "can," that we ought to live up to the demands of morality implies we can. But we can, Hare argues, only if we have the requisite extra-human assistance.<sup>2</sup> Zagzebski and Hare suggest that Christian theism postulates exactly what more is needed: divine revelation, assurance and guidance, grace, sanctification, and the like.

The rationality of behaving altruistically in particular may seem dubious apart from theism. Genuine altruism is sacrificial behavior exclusively for another; it incurs no benefit to oneself, kin, or group. The possibility of such behavior, or at least the rationality thereof, is excluded from the contemporary Darwinian paradigm of naturalistic evolution (Schloss, 1998). Altruism is not just compatible with theism, however, but central to the ethical framework of theism (at least Christian theism). So if you're inclined to think there is genuine altruism, and further that it is not just rational but praiseworthy, then you've got something that supports theism over naturalism. Pruss (2013) argues that altruism is indeed praiseworthy, which makes it irreducibly normative. But naturalistic, scientific explanation is always in terms of nonnormative facts. Thus, even if there can be a naturalistic explanation for altruistic behavior (i.e., how it evolved), there cannot be a naturalistic explanation for why it is normal/appropriate. But because there are good theistic explanations for the irreducibly normative nature of altruism (e.g., humans could be altruistic because their nature reflects God's own altruistic nature), altruism is evidence for theism.

That there is something morally special about human beings is the final data point in a moral case for theism I shall consider. Human beings, most would agree, have inherent value. Theism explains this much better than naturalism, since, according to the former, persons are created in the image of a fundamental, supremely valuable person, whereas the latter must explain how there has come to be persons and value, and what makes persons valuable in a universe that's fundamentally impersonal and valueless (Baggett & Walls, 2016; Linville, 2012). Humans are beings of intrinsic worth, but also equal worth. That can be so, however, only if there is something all humans have in common in virtue of which we have equal worth. If naturalism is true, it's hard to see what that could be. Certainly not any

accidental or degreed property, like consciousness, intelligence, skill or talents or abilities, good character, personality, power, influence, wealth, or nationality. But if theism is true, there are many things that could ground our being equally valuable: we all equally reflect God's image, are all equally loved by God, and so on (Moreland, 2009). A similar problem faces naturalists, but not theists, when it comes to the grounding of natural rights (Menuge, 2013, 2019; Montgomery, 1986; Wolterstorff, 2012.).

### 3 | ARGUMENTS FROM MIRACLES

Central to most of the world's theistic religions is a claim that some miraculous event(s) occurred. Clearly an allegedly miraculous event supports God's existence to the extent that the causal activity of a supernatural agent, or God-like being, is indispensable to, or the best explanation of, that event. Thus a generic theistic argument from miracles can be outlined as follows (cf. Bonevac, 2011):

- (1) Miracles are events the best explanation for which invokes a supernatural agent.
- (2) Events of those kinds have actually occurred.
- (3) Therefore, there is a supernatural agent.

Before anything on behalf of (2) can be uttered, a bit of throat-clearing is required. It is now widely recognized that Hume's maxim—that it's always more probable that testimony to a miraculous event is unreliable than it is that the miracle actually occurred—is triply mistaken. First, the maxim assumes that miracles are intrinsically improbable, but that's false if the probability of theism is not low. Second, it ignores the crucial probability that the testimony would be the same if the event did not occur. Third, the maxim simply underestimates the evidential power of witness testimony (on these and other points, see Bonevac, 2011; Earman, 2000). Once Hume's errors are corrected, it will be realized that a proper assessment of any argument from miracles requires investigation of the alleged miracle. I'll mention three arguments from miracles defended by philosophers today.

Tyron Goldschmidt (2019) argues that we have good reason to believe that the miraculous events of the Jewish exodus occurred, since they are central to a tradition that meets the conditions of the Kuzari Principle: a tradition is likely true if it (i) is accepted by a nation; (ii) describes a national experience of a previous generation of that nation; (iii) would be expected to create a continuous national memory until the tradition is in place; (iv) is insulting to that nation; and (v) makes universal, difficult, and severe demands on that nation.<sup>3</sup>

The Kuzari Principle would also seem to give us good reason to believe that the miraculous events of the New Testament occurred, especially the resurrection of Jesus. But defenders of the resurrection instead appeal to numerous pieces of historical evidence which, by commonly accepted historiographical standards, should be deemed credible, such as:

- $e_1$ . Jesus died by crucifixion on a Friday.
- $e_2$ . Jesus was buried in a known tomb.
- $e_3$ . The tomb was reported empty the following Sunday.
- $e_4$ . Romans accused the disciples of stealing Jesus' body.
- $e_5$ . Individuals, groups, friends, and foes soon after experienced seeing Jesus alive and well.
- $e_6$ . The disciples' claim that Jesus was "resurrected" was a novel use of the term/concept.
- $e_7$ . Jesus' followers abruptly changed observing sabbath from Saturday to Sunday.
- $e_8$ . Many, including previous critics, converted to Christian belief, despite severe persecution.
- $e_9$ . The apostles and other Christians were martyred, with none recanting their testimony.
- ⋮
- $e_n$ , ...

In Bayesian terms, where the relevant hypothesis is “Jesus rose from the dead,” or R, Swinburne (2003) argues that  $\Pr(R|e_1-e_n) \gg 0.5$  and McGrew and McGrew (2012) argue that  $\Pr(e_1-e_n|R)/\Pr(e_1-e_n|\sim R) \gg 1$ , therefore  $e_1-e_n$  highly confirms R over  $\sim R$ .<sup>4</sup> Others simply argue that R is the best explanation of some or all of  $e_1-e_n$  (Craig, 2002; Habermas, 2021; Licona, 2010; Wright, 2003).

A potentially powerful but relatively neglected argument from miracles is that from fulfilled prophecy.<sup>5</sup> If an event foretold at  $t_1$  occurs at  $t_2$  that could not have been predicted by natural means, could not have been brought about because it was foretold, and is highly unlikely to have occurred as foretold by chance, then we can justifiably take it to be fulfilled prophecy, and hence, evidence of divine orchestration (Mackie, 1982). There have been admirable attempts at demonstrating that a handful of Old Testament prophecies have been fulfilled (Newman, 1988; Newman, et al., 2003), but the relevant passages permit a range of interpretations that make an open-shut case difficult (but see Gauch, 2014). The most striking candidate is doubtlessly the messianic prophecies of Psalm 22 and Isaiah 53, apparently fulfilled by Jesus. No one disputes that these texts were written hundreds of years prior to Jesus, and it dubious that the Gospel writers could have forged core details of Jesus' death. Where M is the hypothesis “Jesus was the prophesied messiah,” Lydia McGrew (2013) estimates that the historical evidence confirms M over  $\sim M$  by a factor of 25 million.

Three closing remarks on arguments from miracles are in order. First, it's important to understand that arguments which appeal to miracles as recorded in ancient texts need not assume the general historical reliability of those texts. The historian's job is to sift the historical wheat from chaff, and the better arguments appeal only to the wheat. Second, although the most common arguments from miracles appeal to alleged historical events such as the resurrection of Jesus, there are no shortage of contemporary events which might be appealed to as well (Keener, 2011, 2021; McNabb & Blado, 2020).<sup>6</sup> Finally, while it's often assumed that arguments from miracles should be brought in only on the heels of a good case for theism, Menssen and Sullivan (2002) issue correction here. It would be odd, to say the least, to consider information-rich signals from outer space as potential evidence for extraterrestrial intelligent beings only after one has independent evidence for the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent beings. The signals themselves might be the best evidence! Likewise, divine revelation in the form of miracles might be the best evidence of God's existence, and so foolish to consider only after one has independent evidence for God's existence.<sup>7</sup> In a recent application of their point, Menssen and Sullivan (2021) consider the “fittingness” of the miracle of the incarnation as a stand-alone argument for Christian theism.<sup>8</sup>

## 4 | EXPERIENTIAL ARGUMENTS

Perhaps the most common reason people give for believing in God is their own experience. William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) and Rudolf Otto's *The Idea of the Holy* (1917) are often credited as bringing attention to just how common, rich, and diverse religious experiences are, ranging from the mundane to the sublime, and can be direct or mediated through nature, other people, or objects.

Religious experience is widespread, consistent, and persistent enough that, Hick (1989) argues, if it's unreliable, we should also think sense experience generally is unreliable. But we don't, so it isn't. Establishing parity between religious experience and other experience we assume is reliable has proven a popular way of advancing the argument. Caroline Davis (1989) draws an intriguing parity with esthetic experience. We tend to trust the experiences of aesthetes (i.e., an esthetic expert, such as a wine taster, musician, or painter), so why shouldn't we trust the experiences of religious people, especially saints, who are effectively religious experts? Both aesthetes and saints undergo a kind of training to hone certain experiences, and the non-expert's lack of such experiences counts for nothing against experts' judgments.<sup>9</sup> The most developed parity argument is Alston's in *Perceiving God* (1991). According to Alston, because there is no non-circular way to demonstrate the reliability of perception, we have no choice but to treat beliefs based on perceptual experience as reliable just as a matter of socially established doxastic practice. But the same goes for beliefs based on religious experience, such as belief in God. Indeed, religious experience seems to

have the same basic epistemic structure as perceptual experience: a perceiver, a putative object of perception, and the perceiver's phenomenal experience of that object, or qualities thereof. Beliefs based on religious experience and beliefs based on perceptual experience, therefore, are close epistemic companions.

Swinburne's approach, dating back to the 70s, is refreshingly simple by comparison (most recent is Swinburne, 2018). It is a widely accepted epistemic principle that if it seems to *S* that *x* is present, then probably, *x* is present. Experience generally should be presumed innocent until proven guilty. If it seems to me that a table is present, probably, there is. Likewise, if it seems to me that God is present, probably, He is. Interestingly, Swinburne thinks the reverse is not true. Suppose I say it seems to me that there is no table in the room. According to Swinburne, I have a good reason for thinking there's no table in the room only if the following counterfactual is true: if there were a table in the room, I probably would see it. In a small, neatly organized room, that's true. In a cluttered airplane hangar, that's false. Likewise, it's seeming to me that there is no God is only evidence for there being no God if: if there were a God, I would probably experience him. But that seems false: the degree to which one experiences God would seem to be something entirely up to Him. Other spirited defenses of the Swinburnian approach include Davis (1989), Gellman (1997), and Kwan (2011).<sup>10</sup> Likening religious beliefs to perceptual beliefs, or epistemic "seemings", has affinities with Plantinga's contention that belief in God is properly basic (Plantinga, 1983) and can result from a natural capacity to sense the divine (Plantinga, 2000).

Can religious experience justify more than the beliefs of just those who have them? Some think so (see Gellman, 1997; Yandell, 1993). Suppose scientists report discovering giant squirrels in northern Minnesota. Unusual, yes, but if you have no reason to mistrust the scientists, and have never been to northern Minnesota yourself, you now have evidence that there are giant squirrels in northern Minnesota, and your evidence increases with the number of reported sightings. *Mutatis mutandis*. People who are otherwise trustworthy report experiences of God—a lot of people, in various cultures and at various times and of various backgrounds and socio-economic status. You now have evidence that God exists. We also cannot ignore the evidential value of a transformed life, as commonly seen in religious converts (Alston, 1993).

Finally, although neglected in this context, near-death and out-of-body experiences (NDEs and OBEs, respectively) can be appealed to in a case for theism insofar as they are taken to have religious significance. And they do seem to: many NDE reports involve experiences of God or heavenly bliss, and lend evidential support to mind-body dualism and postmortem survival. On NDEs and OBEs, see Bailey and Yates (1996), Rivas, et al. (2016), and Habermas (2018). Also neglected is experience of what one takes to be other supernatural beings that populate traditional theistic worldviews, such as Satan and demons (Abraham, 2021). Abraham makes the point effectively by quoting Roméo Dallaire, a Canadian general tasked by the UN to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. After being asked if he still believed in God after encountering so much evil, Lt. Dallaire replied, "I know there is a God because in Rwanda I shook hands with the devil. I have seen him, and I have smelled him and I have touched him. I know the devil exists and therefore I know that there is a God."

## 5 | PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS

It may still be rational to believe God exists even if the question can't be settled on theoretical grounds. Such is the thrust of pragmatic arguments for theism, like Pascal's Wager.

Talk of "Pascal's Wager" is misleading, however, as there are several ways to fill out the decision matrix that favors belief in God. Assuming rationality tracks maximizing expected value, the classic way is to present the expected value of belief in God as infinitely good and the expected value of disbelief in God as finitely good or infinitely bad. Belief in God is therefore the rational choice, since either way belief has higher expected value than disbelief.

But, as the many-God's objection goes, the classic wager gives no reason to favor theism over any number of other *possible* views that promise infinite expected value. True enough, but as Jackson and Rogers (2019) point out, all else being equal, the rational thing to do is to wager on whichever religion that posits an infinite afterlife that you

think is most probably true. In fact, even if atheism is the most intrinsically probable theory, a religion which posits an infinite afterlife will swamp atheism's expected value.

Alternatively, one can avoid problems with weighing infinite utilities by arguing that the expected value of belief in God as finite but still greater than the expected value of disbelief in God. It is rational to believe God exists, even upon insufficient evidence, so long as the *present benefits* of belief outweigh the present costs—a point made by William James (for defense of the so-called Jamesian wager, see Jordan, 2006). What might such present benefits be? McBrayer (2014) and Rota (2016) cite studies by social scientists indicating numerous benefits of belief. For example, data seem to indicate that people who believe in God live longer, have stabler marriages and families, more social support, higher self-esteem, report being happier, more optimistic, hopeful, having a greater sense of meaning and purpose in life, and even greater satisfaction in their sex lives. Thus, the present sociological benefits of belief may outweigh the costs even if theism turns out to be false. And if theism does turn out to be true, there are likely other present benefits still, such as feeling God's love and forgiveness, having your prayers heard and answered, experiencing the joy of worship and leading others to salvation. Thus, if it is rational to think, say, Christianity has at least a 50% chance of being true, it is rational to commit to Christianity and irrational not to. In addition to personal benefits, Copan and Wolf (2020) point to large-scale world benefits produced by Christianity as a practical consideration in its favor.

Notice that above, following Rota, I spoke of rational *commitment* rather than belief. Many have objected to Pascal's Wager on the grounds that belief in God is not something we can do at will. Supposing that's true, there are other ways of wagering for God that are within our control, commitment being among them. Others speak of assenting, assuming, accepting, or acting as if God exist for practical purposes (Golding, 1990).

Richard Creel (1993) frames his own pragmatic argument in terms of the rationality of *devotion* to God. Suppose there's a local girl suspected to have drowned. It'd be a great good if she hadn't. Because you believe it's (epistemically) possible, though unlikely, that she's still alive, it's rational to hope she's still alive, and so rational to devote your day to searching for her. Another example. Suppose nuclear war seems immanent. It'd be a *really great* good if averted. Because you believe it's possible, though unlikely, to avert it, it's quite rational to hope it'll be averted, and so quite rational to devote yourself full time to averting it. Creel thinks examples like these show that the greater the good, the more rational it is to hope for it so long as it is believed possible, and that the more rational it is to hope for something, the more rational it is to devote yourself fully to it. Thus, it is maximally rational to hope for whatever you believe is the greatest possible good, and so maximally rational to devote your life to it, regardless of how improbable its realization. Presumably if God possibly exists, God is the greatest possible good. So if you think God possibly exists, then it is maximally rational for you to hope God exists, and so maximally rational for you to totally devote your life to God, regardless of how improbable God's existence is.

## 6 | CONCLUSION

Aside from its value as a contemporary survey and bibliographic resource, I hope this article and its prequel corrects the common misconception that nothing new has been said about traditional arguments for theism. What are the arguments worth? As I emphasized in the prequel article, it's hard to say apart from broader considerations about the worth of philosophical arguments generally. Just as a country's broad economic and sociopolitical conditions will determine the value of its currency, broader metaphysical and epistemological considerations will ultimately determine the value of theistic arguments.

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## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The seven categories of traditional theistic arguments surveyed are based on the taxonomy of theistic arguments I proposed earlier (McIntosh, 2019), where I survey an additional seven categories of nontraditional theistic arguments: metaphysical, nomological, axiological, noological, linguistic, anthropological, and meta-arguments. I choose to speak of “theistic arguments” instead of “natural theology.” The latter term is a holdover from a time when theology and philosophy were happily married, and it had a more restricted meaning that would exclude some contemporary theistic arguments, such as arguments from miracles and religious experience. But theology and philosophy have long since divorced, with analytic philosophy having taken custody of theistic arguments while theology pursues its affair with continental exotica. Thus, the former term better reflects the current subject matter. A final note: needless to say, space restrictions prevent covering critical replies to material covered in this article.
- <sup>2</sup> Hare and others are influenced by Kant here, who has a theistic argument of his own in the neighborhood: we ought (morally) to promote the realization of the highest good. The “highest good,” for Kant, is perfect proportionment of happiness (in the eudaimonistic sense) to virtue. What we ought to do must be possible for us to do. But it is possible for us to promote the realization of the highest good only if there exists a God who makes that realization possible, because only God can ensure perfect proportionment of happiness to virtue. So, there is a God. On this argument, see Goetz (2012) and especially Wood (2020).
- <sup>3</sup> The Kuzari Principle is named after the twelfth-century Jewish philosopher HaLevi’s dialogue, *The Kuzari*.
- <sup>4</sup> Although the McGrews are primarily concerned with the likelihood inequality of  $R$  over  $\sim R$ , the evidence is such that, unless the prior probability of  $R$  is astronomically low, its posterior probability,  $\Pr(R|e_1-e_n)$ , is high. My thanks to Lydia McGrew for discussion of this point. A note also on Swinburne. Swinburne’s argument includes  $R$  within a much larger framework that goes like this. Given the evidence from natural theology, let’s suppose the prior probability that God exists is moderate. Now, if God exists, it’s as likely as not that He would become incarnate, since we might expect him to provide sinners a means of atonement, solidarity in their suffering, and an exemplary life to emulate. Becoming incarnate is a good way to do those things. Further, we can suppose that if God became incarnate, He would probably (i) live a certain kind of life, and (ii) end it with a divine signature like a “super miracle.” It just so happens that we have good historical evidence that (i) one man, Jesus, lived the kind of life we would expect God incarnate to live, and (ii) that man’s life ended with a super miracle, namely, the resurrection. This coincidence makes it very probable indeed that there is a God who became incarnate in Jesus and resurrected from the dead.
- <sup>5</sup> I say relatively neglected because historically, arguments from fulfilled prophecy were the favorite of Christian apologists, from the writers of the New Testament and the church Fathers to Pascal, Locke, and others.
- <sup>6</sup> Keener’s two-volume work in which hundreds of contemporary miracle reports are investigated is a veritable *tour de force*. His concluding remarks are worth quoting: “I recognize that some genuine scholars will demur from my ... argument that some cases of supernatural causation are likely, as I myself once did. What I do not believe is intellectually legitimate is to simply dismiss on the basis of preexisting assumptions the sincerity of all the [hundreds of] millions of persons who claim to have witnessed such phenomena, or to insist that such claims could arise only gradually in legend or through a writer’s imagination. Such insistence flies in the face of an extraordinary amount of evidence, denying voluminous and cross-cultural testimony merely on the basis of a dogmatic theory forged in a very different era and context. ... In view of even the very limited number of cases I have offered ..., I would consider such sweeping claims ... to be impossibly naïve and misinformed. ... Any finite number of firsthand observations may be technically anecdotal, but the witnesses are surely no more biased for believing that they have seen [apparently miraculous things] than are those who, not having seen them, deny that anyone else could have seen them either” (763–764).
- <sup>7</sup> Hugh Gauch concisely expresses Menssen and Sullivan’s point as follows: “A compound proposition does not necessarily require separate or preliminary defense of every embedded proposition. ... ‘God reveals; God reveals implies God exists; therefore God reveals and God exists’ is a valid argument of the form ‘A; A implies B; therefore A and B.’ The additional premise ‘B’ or ‘God exists’ is not necessary to reach the conclusion ‘A and B’ or ‘God reveals and God exists’; indeed, it would be a superfluous addition to this valid argument.” Personal communication, Aug. 26, 2021.
- <sup>8</sup> In this connection, Stephen T. Davis (2006) offers a serious defense of C. S. Lewis’ popular trilemma argument for the incarnation.
- <sup>9</sup> *Au contraire*, the commonality of religious experience suggests it’s hardly a reward of expertise. Perhaps the better analogy is that between those who don’t have religious experiences and those who are colorblind or tone-deaf.

<sup>10</sup> The Swinburnian approach, as well as the argument in the preceding paragraph, is anticipated in Broad (1953).

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